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The Commission for Railway Safety (CRS) long-awaited report on the Balasore train tragedy, which claimed 290 lives and injured more than 1,000, has been presented to the Railway Board. It holds testimonials from staff questioning and explores various aspects of the site and the railway’s origins.
Although railroad officials declined to comment on the contents of the report citing the ongoing CBI investigation, News18 obtained large portions of the document through sources.
The report clearly states that the accident was a crash case where the Coromandel Express’ speedometer reading suddenly dropped to zero. The collision involved the Coromandel Express, a Chennai-Kolkata passenger train, which entered the overhead line near Bahanaga Bazar railway station where a goods train was already stationed. The collision derailed and stopped the last of the Bengaluru Howrah Superfast Express buses on another lane.
“Vulnerabilities at multiple levels in S&T (Signal and Communications) were responsible for this incident,” the report said.
The investigation into the accident, one of the deadliest in the history of Indian Railways, was initially handed over to the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) and then to the Central Bureau of Investigation. A.M. Chowdhary, Commissioner of Railway Safety, South East Constituency, has been given the task of investigation.
“We will not be able to comment or disclose the CRS report due to another ongoing CBI investigation. Until the end of the CBI report, we will not consider commenting on it either,” said a railroad official when reached for comment.
However, sources said the CRS report has cleared the cloud of confusion over the cause of the accident and action will be taken soon.
What led to the accident?
Railway sources indicated that problems with the point/junction before the signal caused the Coromandel Express to enter the loop line instead of the main line. The same was reportedly confirmed by CRS. The calculations of the local pilot and the local co-pilot together with the supervisors’ joint report after the accident, which stated that the point was set in reverse while the signal was green for the main line, were taken into account.
“Derailment was not the initial cause of the accident and it was quite clear from the start. The locomotive was not due for any inspection and this is mentioned a lot by CRS. The rolling stock or the track also had nothing to do with the accident and it is very clear in the report. Hence, it was only a system The signals that everyone was seeing,” said a senior officer familiar with the developments.
Gaps in the switch signal circuit
The conclusion of the CRS report delves into lapses in a signaling circuit change made in the station’s north signaling room in the past and also during the replacement of the Electric Lifting Barrier (ELB) for Level 94 crossing gate. Somewhere down the line, this resulted in a false signal for the train.
According to the report, while mentioning the loopholes, the safety officer referred to circuit switching work that was done due to cable fault back in 2018. Allegedly, this switching was done without following standard practices and there were wrong lettering on the stations.
Similarly, the Electric Lift Barrier (ELB) circuit for Junction Level (LC) 79 of Balasore Station, used to modify the ELB circuit of LC-94 at Bahanaga Bazar Railway Station, was not suitable. There was no approved electrical circuit diagram to perform ELB replacement work for the LC-94 that could prevent this error.
According to a railway official, these two periods were responsible for the accident. The replacement work of science and technology personnel was affected by these incidents, misleading them. Despite the point set for the loop line, the signal showed green for the top line, causing the Coromandel Express to travel to the loop line instead of the intended top line.
who is in Charge?
While the CRS report stated that the circuit diagram was not provided for the ELB replacement work, responsibility for the accident was placed with the Signals and Communications Department. It has been conclusively indicated that vulnerabilities at multiple levels in the department were responsible for the accident. It has also been mentioned that had the station manager told S&T employees of Crossover 17A/B’s strange behavior, they could have found a problem with the wiring that connects to the crossover’s electronic logic. This can prevent the accident.
Importantly, observations of the events recorded in the data logger from the same day indicated that the point operation on the same day took longer than usual at around 4:21 p.m. There was another abnormal event in the state change, which may have been ignored.
While the railway did not comment on the findings, it is important to note that it was based on documents and sources from within the railway. This report will be updated if the official railway copy is received.
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